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PREFACE 
The author of this paper, Dr Robert Bohall, works with the Economic 
Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). He 
has been recently working on an exchange basis with the Australian 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics in Canberra (BAE). 
Dr Bohall presented this paper while on a visit to New Zealand 
Universities and Government Departments in December 1982. The paper 
reviews the present situation regarding U.S. agricultural and macroeconomic 
policies with respect to their implications for the New Zealand farm 
sector. 
The paper is reproduced here with the kind permission of the author. 
The views expressed in the paper are those of Dr Bohall and do ~ot 
necessarily represent those of the USDA or BAE. 
P.D. Chudleigh 
Director 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The author wishes to acknowledge helpful comments made by 
Tom Nguyen, Murray Johns, Steve Blank and David Smith on various drafts 
of this paper. Bohall (1982), Lesher (1982), Johnson (1982) and Barrett 
(1982) were invaluable references in the preparation and updating of 
the paper along with numerous issues of the popular press including 
Time Magazine, Newsweek Magazine, and the Australian Financial Review. 
(iii) 

1. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S.A. is an important force in world economic activity and 
agricultural trade. Developments in the United States impact on New 
Zealand farmers on both the demand and supply side. The net effect 
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of Reaganomics depends to what degree world agricultural demand is 
stimulated through U.S. macroeconomic policy versus being offset through 
increased commodity supplies and competition for export markets from 
specific support for the US agricultural sector. 
This paper initially reviews 'Reaganomics' and the current macroeconomlC 
and agricultural environment in the United States. It is generally 
a truism that U.S. policy, as with most governments, is developed with 
domestic priorities taking precedence. The implications are that while 
international relationships are very important and there are strong 
ties between the U.S.A. and New Zealand, it is the political and social 
pressures within the U.S.A. that predominate in the development of 
national macroeconomic policy and agricultural legislation. It is 
later argued that: 
(i) U.S. agricultural policy and U.S. macroeconomic policy may be 
of about equal importance in" terms of direct implications for 
New Zealand farmers; 
(ii) the fundamentals of commodity markets are still the primary factors 
influencing grower returns and profits for farmers in both New 
Zealand and the U.S.A.; 
(iii) less support in real terms is provided under most U.S. agricultural 
programs than was the case five years ago; 
(iv) there is the strong possibility that 'protectionism and predatory 
export policies' may increase in the U.S. and around the world; 
and 
(v) the U.S. is heading toward economic recovery but 
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2. U.S. MACROECONOMIC POLICY (REAGANOMICS) 
The policies of the current U.S. Administration are many and varied, 
are not always consistent, and certainly have evolved through political 
compromise and trade-offs. As originally conceived the major tenets 
of the Reagan program include: 
(i) Slowing down the very high rate of inflation In the U.S. economy. 
(ii) Cutting taxes - supply side economics. 
(iii) Deregulating business - relying on the market place. 
(iv) Increasing exports - improving the balance of payments. 
(v) Balancing the federal budget - minimising cost exposure. 
(vi) Increasing defence spending. 
(vii) Maintaining or revitalising economic growth. 
The concerns of New Zealand and other countries are that Reaganomics 
may not result In an economic recovery in the U.S.A. and that world 
demand and New Zealand export markets may be adversely affected to 
the detriment of producers. In addition as one of New Zealand's major 
customers and competitors, the policies of the current Administration 
influence agricultural export prospects to the U.S. and U.S. agricultural 
exports to other countries in competition for world markets. 
Let us briefly review where Reaganomics is at the moment - what 
has occurred and what may occur with respect to the U.S. economy. 
(i) Tight money policy. The U.S. Federal Reserve Board (FRB) has 
kept the lid on the growth in the U.S. money supply - the target for 
M-I (all cash plus deposits In checking accounts) has been around 5.5 
per cent per year. Earlier In the year economists argued the temptation 
to relax monetary controls and increase the money supply in the short 
run would be to the detriment of longer run economic growth and renewed 
inflation. However in mid-October Mr Volker, Chairman of the FRB who 
has been a tough advocate of restraint in monetary policy indicated 
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a more relaxed approach. He indicated the FRB feels inflation has 
been largely wrung out of the U.S. economy and the forces are present 
that would push the U.S. toward recovery to be fueled by increased 
buying by consumers. While there will be no basic change in anti-inflationary 
policy by the Fed the policy objective should be to facilitate and 
sustain a U.S. economic recovery. 
(ii) Lower inflation. Annual rates of inflation for the U.S. economy 
are now estimated at around 4-5 per cent, in contrast to around 13 
per cent in 1979 and 1980. Tight money policy has been effective In 
cooling off the inflation rate and inflationary expectations. In March 
1982, the U.S. Consumer Price Index declined for the first time since 
1965 and in September the U.S. Prices Paid Index declined by 1.7 per 
cent. Part of the slow-down in inflation has also been a substantial 
cooling off In world markets of primary commodity prices, particularly 
for energy and agricultural crops. 
(iii) High but declining interest rates. Actual rates of inter~st 
are still high by historical standards in the U.S.A. but have declined 
substantially since early in 1982. The U.S. prime rate in early December 
was 11.5 per cent (compared with 16.5 per cent in July) and the lowest 
in over two years. Inter company loans and the discount rate for banks 
were around 9 per cent and rates for Treasury bills 7-8 per cent. 
With nominal interest rates declining more rapidly than the rate of 
inflation the real rate of interest has also fallen from the extremely 
high levels in the first half of 1982. The impact of lower interest 
rates on housing starts, Christmas retail sales, business investment 
and the restructuring of debt remains to be seen. Automobile sales 
were up substantially In November. Previously analysts had argued 
a decline in nominal interest rates to 12-14.5 per cent (a goal which 
has been surpassed) would be necessary before there is such turn-around 
in the U.S. economy. 
(iv) Decline in business investment and consumer demand. With previously 
high interest rates and reduced profit expectations, businesses in 
the U.S.A. have been postponing investments in new technology, depleting 
their capital stock and deferring new purchases of goods and services. 
This 'wait and see' attitude of running down stocks rather than investing 
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in new production has contributed to unemployment and slowing economic 
recovery. U.S. consumers have been reluctant with uncertain employment 
and wage prospects coupled with finance costs to purchase on credit 
especially for 'big ticket' items such as housing, automobiles, and 
appliances. However, housing starts in October were up I per cent 
over September and 31 per cent above the depressed October 1981 level. 
(v) High unemployment. Unemployment rates in the world have been 
rising and are now close to 9 per cent overall, the highest of recent 
history. In the U.S.A., the November unemployment level of 10.8 per 
cent, equal to 12.0 million workers, is the highest. aince the depression 
years of the 1930's. The combination of uncertain economic expectations 
and deferred business investment and consumer expenditure has resulted 
in layoffs and a reduction in new employment opportunities. In September 
1982, the U.S. unemployment rate for 'blue collar' workers was 15.6 
per cent, blacks over 20 per cent, and construction workers 22.6 per 
cent. However, rates are well below the 24.9 per cent level of 1933 
at the height of the depression and with some ~ncrease in the U.S. 
workforce participation rate (especially females), may not be exactly 
comparable to say the 1960's, or the depression years. The unemployment 
rate was a major campaign issue in the recent U.S. Congressional elections 
which resulted in gains in the U.S. House of Representatives and in 
State elections for the Democratic Party. 
(vi) Recession (decline in real GNP over two quarters). In the U.S.A., 
real GNP declined by over 5 per cent in both the December 1981 and 
March 1982 quarters. The June quarter showed an ~ncrease of 2. I per 
cent and the September estimate was a disappointing no change. 
U.S. factories have been running at 68 per cent capacity, the 
lowest on record and the economy has been moving sideways. The index 
of industrial production in October was 8.6 per cent less than in October, 
1981. Analysts are still divided on whether the recent surge in the 
U.S. stock market represents a real business turnaround or merely a 
reaction to the Federal Reserve attempts to create one. The index 
of leading indicators has risen in five of the last six months. Earlier 
OECD forecasts called for about a 2.5 per cent real gain in U.S. GNP 
for 1983 but cautioned this may be high. The U.S. National Association 
of Business economists recently projected a 3.3 per cent growth for 
the same period. 
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An interesting argument regarding recent lower interest rates 
and inflation is the possibility this could be evidence of falling 
economic activity and falling demand for funds rather than the greater 
availability of funds. Lord Keynes indicates there are two elements 
of recession: 
(a) Genuinely deficient effective demand (in monetary and real 
terms) and, 
(b) Prospective profitability of new investment so low that 
no matter how low interest rates fall there will be no 
stimulus to investment. 
Therefore even if the U.S. relaxes controls and increases the money 
supply to decrease interest rates, it is conceivable this will not 
result ~n an increase in demand (the liquidity trap). However, other 
economists argue the liquidity trap is probably non-existent and that 
under the curr~nt situation real interest rates are still quite high 
(i.e. 11.5 per cent prime rate and inflation rate of less that 5 per 
ce~t). The liquidity trap might be more relevant if nominal interest 
rates fell to 3 per cent and inflation to zero. 
(vii) Cut ~n taxes. A politically popular 25 per cent tax cut, estimated 
at US$750,000m over five years, was passed in 1981 by the U.S. Congress. 
By July 1982 a significant portion of the cut (15 per cent) had been 
implemented, and an additional 10 per cent reduction is scheduled to 
take place in July 1983. However in order to reduce expected 'excessive' 
government budget deficits legislation was passed in August 1982 which 
will increase U.S. taxes by an estimated US$99 billion over the next 
three years and partially offset the earlier tax cut. 
(viii) Major budget deficits expected. To date, a record 1982 budget 
deficit of US$I 10,000m has occurred, equal to 3.6 per cent of GNP. 
In relative terms this is less than the 4 per cent US$66,400m previous 
record that occurred in 1976 but far above initial estimates. With 
increases in defence spending, reductions in tax revenue, and despite 
budget trimming in social programs, the U.S. budget deficit is currently 
projected by the Administration at around US$llO,OOOm for 1983, or 
by the U.S. congressional Budget office at US$155,000m. With a federal 
deficit as a share of the economy of 5-6 per cent, this could equal 
the rate of capital formation or investment in productive facilities. 
At an equal level, there is the danger federal financing could crowd 
out private investment. 
Currently the u.s. administration is drafting the 1984 budget. 
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Prospects are for a deficit well in excess of US$IOO,OOOm. Congress 
will likely be looking at the revenue side to increase the taxable 
income base by lowering tax deductions and consider further cuts in 
social programs (retirement, health etc.) as well as slowing down the 
increase in military spending. 
(ix) Increased Protectionism - export subsidies. Increasingly in 
recent months various countries including the u.s. have been tinkering 
with the terms of international trade. Tariff and non-tariff barriers 
on imports of automobiles, steel, electrical goods, high technology 
products, and agricultural commodities including sugar and beef have 
been developed. Pressure has been exerted on u.s. trading partners 
including Japan to expand imports of raw products through lowering 
trade barriers and guaranteeing a higher degree of market access. 
Legislation has been enacted to subsidise u.s. exports of agricultural 
products to meet the competition of other countries, particularly the 
E.E.C., in world markets. Other legislation that would include any 
product or group of products has been introduced in the U.S. Congress 
aimed at 'reciprocity' or meeting perceived export subsidies by foreign 
governments. The types of trade policies being considered are reminiscent 
of the depression years when 'beggar thy neighbour' isolationist types 
of regulations contributed to the downfall in the world economic conditions. 
The recent 'collapse' or lack of significant progress at the GATT ministerial 
meetings is likely to improve the chances that some of the nearly 100 
protectionist bills before Congress are enacted. 
(x) Lack of major improvement in u.S. economy to date. The U.S. 
economy moved into a deep recession in the first half of 1982 and experienced 
only slight improvement in the third quarter. Some recovery in the 
fourth quarter is possible. The expectation is that, with inflation 
under control, with the I July tax cut, with budget deficits manageable, 
and with the decline in interest rates, investment will pick up, housing 
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starts and automobile sales will improve and the U.S. economy will 
rebound and Reaganomics will succeed. This scenario is not impossible, 
but the timing has been delayed and, as a result, U.S. economic recovery 
now looks more likely in 1983 as opposed to the last half of 1982. 
Recession has tended to move with some lag to other countries 
including New Zealand. The real concern is that the U.S. recovery 
may be too weak and that the impacts of Reaganomics and policies of 
other governments including the E.E.C. and Japan may not pull the world 
economy out of the current recessionary period. 
In the event that an economic recovery ln the U.S. does occur, 
because of the important impact of the U.S. on the economies of all 
the Western industrialised nations, the demand for New Zealand agricultural 
products, particularly beef and wool, should strengthen. This could 
improve the outlook for farmers but the more fundamental problem of 
agricultural policy remains. Alternatively, prolonged recession or 
weak recovery in the developed economies will tend to exacerbate the 
low income prospects facing the New Zealand agricultural sector in 
1982-83. 
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3. U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
U.S. agricultural policy is determined within the constraints 
of the administrator's budget, which is monitored by the U.S. Congressional 
Budget Office, and the U.S. political environment. In the U.S. Senate 
the agricultural sector tends to have relatively more influence since 
Senators are elected on the basis of two per State. In the House of 
Representatives Congressmen are elected on the basis of population 
and urban concerns tend to overwhelm agricultural issues. Agricultural 
policy also reflects regional and commodity interests and coalitions 
with dairy and field crops are usually able to sustain strong political 
support. Livestock interests usually are content to benefit from, 
and support, programs that will result in plentiful supplies of relatively 
low cost feed grains. Minor commodities and other special agricultural 
interests rely on alliances with broader groups to achieve support. 
Overall the agricultural sector in the U.S. would have proportionally 
less influence than in New Zealand and the relative influence of the 
sector has been declining over time. There is a strong recognition 
by urban groups of the benefits of agricultural exports with' regard to 
the U.S. balance of payments and need for foreign exchange as well 
as the benefits of low food prices to U.S. consumers. Within this 
context there are at least three major pieces of U.S. agricultural 
legislation that are important for New Zealand producers. 
Firstly is the 1981 Agriculture and Food Act that was passed by the 
U.S. Congress and signed into law by President Reagan in December of last 
year. It is a four-year authorisation bill for many farm programs, with 
commodity provisions generally applying to the 1982-85 crop years. In 
addition P.L.-480, or foreign food assistance, and export credit programs 
are covered by this legislation. Secondly are the agricultural provisions 
of the Budget Reconciliation Act signed into law 8 September 1982. Thirdly 
is the U.S. Meat Import Act of 1979. 
For wheat and the feed grains, the dual commodity income and price 
support system, is continued through the 1985 crop year. Income support 
is provided through the target price concept, which guarantees eligible 
producers a direct deficiency payment if farm prices fall below established 
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target prices ($4.30 on wheat and $2.86 for corn in 1983). Price support 
will continue through a non-recourse loan programe, with levels determined 
by the Secretary of Agriculture. Minimum loan rates for the 1983 crops 
of wheat and corn (maize) were increased to US$3.65 and US$2.65 respectively 
under the Budget Reconciliation Act. Grain price support measures available 
under the 1981 Act also include the farmer-owned reserve, set-aside and 
acreage-reduction programs. 
For wool, the farm bill extends the u.s. National Wool Act of 1954 
through to December 1985. Support rates were lowered to 77.5 per cent 
from 85 per cent of the formula rate. The formula rate is US62¢/lb times 
the ratio of the parity index of prices paid by U.S. farmers during the 
past three years to prices paid in 1958 through to 1960. The parity index 
is based on prices paid by farmers for commodities and services, including 
interest, taxes, and farm wage rates. 
Of particular interest to New Zealand are U.S. dairy programs. The 
dairy provisions of the 1981 Act have had to be modified because of program 
cost. Originally the dairy provisions called for a minimum 1983 support 
level of US$13.25/cwt (US$292/t) of milk. This figure was to have increased 
over time to US$14.00/cwt (US$309/t) for 1984 and US$14.60/cwt (US$322/t) 
in 1985. There were separate provisions within the Act which called for 
the minimum support price to be adjusted upward as a fixed percentage of 
parity if the net cost of the program or net government purchases were 
below certain limits. 
However, with the continued rise ~n dairy production (and surplus) 
over the past few months coupled with indications of increases in cow numbers, 
herd expansion, and production per cow and with the availability of relatively 
low cost concentrate feed, new legislation was enacted. The Budget 
Reconciliation Act holds the support level for the 1983 and 1984 program 
years (October 1982 - September 1983, etc.) at US$13. IO/cwt (US$289/t) 
and for 1985 at the same level of parity as represented on I October 1983. 
The bill also permits the Secretary to make a non-refundable US50¢/cwt 
(US$II/t) assessment if purchases are expected to exceed 5 billion pounds 
(2268kt) milk equivalent. This assessment was implemented effective 
I December 1982. The funds will be remitted to the Commodity Credit Corporation 
(CCC) to offset part of the program costs. Effective I April 1983 an 
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additional US50¢ may be deducted if purchases are expected to exceed 7.5 
billion pounds (3400kt). This second deduction would eventually be refunded 
to those producers who lower their output by a specified amount. In effect 
by April 1983 the U.S. dairy price support will likely be US$12. 10 per 
cwt (US$267/t) or nearly 10 per cent less than what was called for in the 
original 1981 legislation. 
The Reconciliation Act also amended previous legislation (the Agricultural 
Act of 1949) to allow donation of surplus dairy products through foreign 
governments, public, and non-profit organisations overseas. 
Factors which are contributing to the U.S. dairy surplus include 
(i) increased production in response to dairy support prices; 
(ii) sluggish demand for dairy products domestically; 
(iii) a history of support price increases at a rate greater than for most 
other farm commodities; 
(iv) low prices for cull cows and the highest ratio of replacement heifers 
to cows on record; 
(v) lack of off-farm job opportunities~ 
(vi) increased farm size and productivity increases; and 
(vii) a favourable milk-to-feed price ratio close to the highs of the past 
20 years. 
The present U.S. dairy surplus is reflected in a 17 per cent ~ncrease 
~n production since the mid-1970's in the face of relatively static demand 
for fluid milk, a slight increase in cow numbers since 1979 after an extended 
long term decline, and continued increases in production which has doubled 
output per cow over the past 25 years. The volume of manufacturing milk 
has increased significantly especially since 1978. 
Since 1949, when the dairy support program began, large quantities 
of dairy products have frequently been purchased by the Government to 
maintain the established support prices. The milk equivalent of these 
purchases has varied substantially, but in the last two years has reached 
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historically very high levels. On average, 38 per cent of annual skim 
milk powder (SMP) production, 8 per cent of annual cheese production and 
14 per cent of annual butter production have been removed from commercial 
markets under the price support program. In the 1981-82 marketing year, 
about 30 per cent of butter production, 67 per cent of SMP production and 
14 per cent of cheese production were purchased by the Commodity Credit 
Corporation. 
In view of these recent purchases, the level of government-owned dairy 
stocks has risen markedly. At I July 1982, government-owned stocks accounted 
for about 7228 kt, milk equivalent, about three times the volume held in 
July 1980. Butter stocks have doubled in the past two years, while cheese 
stocks have been substantial. In the past, most cheese stocks have been 
held by commercial traders; however, in the past two years the amount of 
American cheese (not including processed cheeses) held by the Government 
has increased from about 13 per cent to 60 per cent. Stocks of government-
owned SMP have risen significantly since 1980. The most recently published 
data on stock levels held by the Commodity Credit Corporation (for I October 
1982) are: butter, 182kt; cheese, 374kt (includes processed cheese); 
and SMP, 534kt. 
The cost of the dairy price support program has escalated in line 
with government purchases of dairy products. In 1979, the net expenditure 
of the Commodity Credit Corporation on dairy price support was only $250.6m. 
The net expenditure by the Corporation in the following two years rose 
to $1279.8m and $1974.4m, respectively, and is projected to have reached 
more than $2000m in 1982. The cost of the program was a primary factor 
influencing the adoption of the revised dairy support program. 
The combination of low feed prices, and low beef prices and/or a high 
level of replacement heifers, will likely result in 1983 milk production 
at about the same as in 1982 (61.2 Mt). While production could decline 
slightly by 1984, analysts indicate it would likely increase faster to 
6 I .9 MT by 1987. 
Historically, the United States has been a net importer of dairy 
products, particularly cheese and casein, although significant quantities 
of SMP (94.5 kt in 1981) have been exported as food aid under the PL 480 
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programs. Increasing costs of maintaining high levels of dairy stocks 
of butter, cheese, skim milk powder and wholemilk powder at a time of high 
interest rates has brought increasing pressure on the U.S.A. to dispose 
of some of these products on overseas markets. 
With limited opportunities to dispose of surplus dairy stocks on the 
domestic market, the United States is likely to resort to placement of 
these stocks on the export market in the near future. The U.S. Government 
is exploring several ways of clearing these products without disrupting 
the international dairy market. Alternatives include: 
concessional sales and donations under the PL 480 program; 
donations to foreign governments and humanitarian organisations 
under section 416 of the Agriculture Act of 1949 (the Corporation 
would be authorised to pay costs for reprocessing, packaging 
and handling and delivery); 
government-to-government sales; 
barter transactions such as a recent trade for bauxite with 
Jamaica; and 
Commodity Credit Corporation sales to private traders. 
The other alternative is for the U.S. to dispose of dairy products 
at highly competitive or even subsidised rates in world markets. There 
is an obvious concern in the U.S. about the lack of progress at the recent 
GATT ministerial meetings. Dairy products presumably could be used In 
a 'trade war' with the E.E.C. which would have major indirect impacts upon 
New Zealand producers. The mechanisms and timing of such a 'trade war' 
are uncertain and given the depressed state of the world dairy market for 
products such as skim milk powder, butter and cheese the prospects for 
significant sales of these products appear limited. In any event, it is 
not apparent at this moment that such a 'trade war' will occur nor that 
if it does what the magnitude and overall impact will be. 
The likely continuation of surplus milk production in the United States 
in the medium term will be an important influence in the international 
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market in the next few years. Recent OECD medium-term projections of likely 
production, consumption and export availability indicate that both the 
E.E.C. and the U.S.A., in spite of measures aimed at curbing production, 
will continue to produce a surplus. A corresponding growth In consumption 
in either the developed or developing countries is unlikely to offset these 
increases. 
The longer term implications of U.S. dairy policy are the maintenance 
of relatively high stocks and their subsequent clearing on export markets. 
This is not only likely to depress world dairy prices, but U.S. exports 
could erode both New Zealand's and Australia's share of export markets. 
Both these countries could face increasing competition from the U.S.A. 
in the developing markets such as OPEC and the newly industrialised countries. 
Import requirements by these countries for dairy products, particularly 
cheese, is forecast to expand in the medium term. 
The U.S. Meat Import Act of 1979 effectively limits imports of beef, 
veal, pork and sheepmeat to roughly 4-5 per cent of U.S. consumption. 
Lamb is specifically excluded from the Act. Features of the Act include 
the determination of a trigger level for the imposition of import quotas. 
The trigger level is I 10 per cent of adjusted base quotas which provides 
an incentive among exporters for voluntary restraint to avoid quotas. 
The adjusted base quota is determined by formula which takes into account 
average U.S. imports for the 10 year period 1968-1977, increases in average 
commercial production of quota products versus the historical base production 
period, and a counter cyclical component which lS designed to allow for 
increased imports in years of relatively low U.S. production and vice versa. 
The Act also allows the President to intervene to increase imports when 
U.S. prices have been rising rapidly if the countercyclical component is 
more than 1.0 (relatively low U.S. cow beef production per person). New 
Zealand has agreed to limit 1982 exports to the U.S. to around 155kt or 
slightly over 26 per cent of the estimated global total of 1.295 billion 
pounds (587kt). The current trigger level is 1.3 billion pounds (590kt). 
I should mention at least one other provision of interest to New Zealand 
meat exporters - the inspection of meat imports. Basically, the 1981 
Agriculture and Food Act requires that U.S. meat imports will be subject 
to the same inspection, sanitary, quality, species-verification and residue 
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standards applied to products produced In the U.S.A. This should not present 
a problem to New Zealand producers and does not prohibit entry of foreign 
meat because drugs or chemicals banned in the U.S.A. were used during the 
production process. 
The 1981 Agriculture and Food Act extends the Agricultural Trade 
Development and Assistance Act of 1954, more commonly known as PL 480, 
until December 31 1985. It provides in addition for an export credit 
revolving fund to finance export sales of U.S. agricultural commodities 
on credit terms not to exceed three years. The fund would be used only 
for purposes of market development and expansion where there is substantial 
potential for developing or enhancing regular comnlercial markets. 
The agricultural provisions of the Budget Reconciliation Act also 
mandate that for fiscal years 1983, 1984 and 1985 US$175-190 million be 
used annually for agricultural export promotion activities including interest 
buy downs, direct credits or subsidies so that 'American farmers and exporters 
may compete in international trade on an equal basis'. A particular concern 
indicated by U.S. Congressional conferees in finalising the legislation 
was the use of export subsidies by foreign governments in violation of 
obligations under trade agreements (i.e. GATT). The Conferees believed 
the U.S. cannot tolerate unfair trade practices and allow other countries 
to make use of export subsidies on agricultural products to capture markets 
from the U.S. On 20 October 1982 Secretary Block announced a three year 
US$1500 million 'blended credit' program to expand exports of U.S. agri-
cultural products. Annually for fiscal 1983, 1984 and 1985 this will consist 
of US$IOO million of the Reconciliation Act funds coupled with US$400 million 
of PL 480 direct credit authorities to expand sales in developing countries 
particularly those with good long-term market growth potentials. 
The U.S. agricultural situation leading into 1983 indicates total 
1982 wheat production at an all time high of over 76 million tonnes, I 
per cent above last year, so its likely even with near record disappearance -
particularly exports - that year end stocks will continue to climb and 
be the highest Slnce the early 1960's. The U.S. September crop report 
reinforced the outlook for a domestic feed grain production of over 250 
million tonnes including record corn and soybean crops and a substantial 
buildup in stocks which will keep prices under pressure. Export prospects 
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are tempered by poor world wide econom~c conditions but falling interest 
rates may provide a positive influence. Cattle feeding is expanding and 
the number of cattle on feed in 7 major States on 1 September was up 8 
per cent over a year ago. Hog production is favourable but may not expand 
until the last half of 1983; broiler and dairy production are running 
2-3 per cent ahead of last year. 
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4. THE IMPACTS OF U.S: MACROECONOMIC AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY ON THE 
NEW ZEALAND FARM SECTOR 
No attempt has been made in this paper to precisely quantify the 
many impacts of U.S. policy on New Zealand agricultural producers. However, 
there are a number of observations or testable hypotheses regarding the 
impacts of Reaganomics that deserve emphasis in concluding. 
(i) U.S. macroeconomic and monetary policy through impacts on the world 
international economy and particularly upon exchange and interest 
rates may be equally important as U.S. agricultural policy on New 
Zealand farmers. Given the importance of meat and dairy exports 
in particular and the increasing likelihood of trade conflict and 
subsidisation ~n the agricultural sector, U.S. agricultural policy 
can have a major impact on New Zealand farm incomes over the next 
two to three years and override macroeconomic events. However, 
the recent significant decline in interest and inflation rates and 
a possible turnaround in world recession should stimulate demand 
for New Zealand agricultural commodities such as beef, dairy products 
and wool. A depreciation of the U.S. dollar against the New Zealand 
dollar and other currencies may not strengthen New Zealand's competitive 
position in third countries for export markets, but stronger world 
economies should boost international trade overall. Conversely, 
failure to achieve a world economic recovery would likely result 
in sluggish demand for New Zealand agricultural exports in 1983 
and a loss of income for farmers. 
(ii) The fundamentals of commodity markets are still the primary factors 
influencing grower returns and the profit picture for farmers in 
both New Zealand and the U.S.A. With world commodity surpluses, 
prices will decline. Current heavy world dairy stocks will keep 
prices near current levels over the next few months. Similarly, 
for New Zealand farmers, the outlook for wool is not strong with 
current high stock levels in both producing and processing countries 
serving to overhang the market already depressed by world recession 
especially in the OECD countries. The outlook for meat exports 
in 1983 will be dampened due to the relatively high drought induced 
supplies in Australia and the continued uncertainty regarding world 
economic recovery. 
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(iii) The impact of the u.s. farm legislation as implemented by the Reagan 
Administration in 1981 and 1982 is to reduce risk, provide relatively 
less price protection, and help u.s. farmers maintain a minimum level 
of returns. As a result, U.S. agricultural production of food and 
feed grains, wool, cotton, rice, soybeans, dairy products and sugar 
will be larger than would be the case without the legislation, and 
world commodity markets will be impacted accordingly because of 
increased supplies. However, the degree of support provided under-
the 1981 legislation is relatively less than was the case under the 
1977 u.s. farm bill. Between 1977 and 1981, the u.s. consumer price 
index (CPI) increased 44 per cent for food and 51 per cent for all 
items. The increase in target prices, loan rates or support levels 
for U.S. agricultural commodities between the 1977 and 1981 farm 
bills was generally much lower, ranging from reduced support to an 
increase of 37 per cent depending on the commodity. The support 
for grains has led to favourable input prices for the dairy and live-
stock sectors. As a result world markets may be sluggish for the 
intermediate term. In the longer run the downward adjustments made 
under the budget Reconciliation Bill should bring about a better 
balance on grains and dairy production. 
Civ) The current recession is building up strong pressures for increased 
'protectionism', export subsidies and the danger of trade wars most 
of which would be detrimental to the New Zealand agricultural sector. 
Be it 'protectionist' measures such as the u.s. Meat Import Act, 
higher tariffs, or voluntary bilateral trade constraints the political 
goals are to protect less efficient or noncompetitive domestic industries 
and employment against imports or to offset 'unfair' competition. 
The result is a decrease in trade, loss of income and an implicit 
tax on the exporter and on consumers in the importing country. To 
counter these measures governments have increasingly taken to directly 
or indirectly subsidising exports to meet the competitive terms of 
trade of other producers and/or to offset the impact of trade barriers. 
A good example of the u.s. 'protectionist' movement is the politics 
of the u.s. Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982. As the bill was being 
developed and debated by the U.S. Congress, the u.s. Farm Bureau 
(the largest and probably the most influential u.s. farm lobby that 
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has long been an advocate of free trade and outspoken against Govern-
ment intervention) called for subsidising U.S. farm products to 
retaliate against subsidised exports from the E.E.C. The Farm Bureau 
President in correspondence with the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture 
indicated that 'negotiations with the European Co~~unity have failed 
and that now is the time for the United States to get tough'. 'American 
farmers can not sit by and let overseas markets be taken over by 
E.E.C. products that are lower in price only because of Government 
subsidies'. It seems plausible that in the U.S. frustrations with 
the costs of agricultural programs especially for dairy, wheat and 
- coarse grains, the expansion of area and production of these products 
by competing exporters (subsidised or not), and the pressures from 
important political farm groups may result in increased reliance 
on export credits, subsidies and incentives in the future perhaps 
even to the de-emphasis of loan rates and target prices. The continu-
ation of world recession and sluggish demand for agricultural and 
industrial goods may inexorably lead governments down the path of 
predatory trade practices. Given New Zealand's reliance on agricultural 
exports particularly for dairy such a path would be disastrous. 
As one commentator indicated the thrashing of the elephants such 
as the U.S.A. and the E.E.C. could trample the trade ground for years 
to come. 
It should be noted that most leading agricultural producers have 
a record of providing assistance to the agricultural sector. New 
Zealand has in place numerous assistance measures (most notably the 
Supplementary Minimum Price scheme) which are leading to increased 
production of meats, wool, dairy products, etc. For example 1981-82 
SMP payments to wool producers in New Zealand totalled $185m. The 
problem is that the good intentions of policy officials in approving 
various subsidy schemes has led to oversupply in the face of world 
recession and slow growth rates In importing countries. 
(v) The U.S. economy is very slowly starting to recover and will likely 
improve over the next several months into 1983. The danger is that 
the recovery may be too weak especially if there is a substantial 
lag between a turn-around in the U.S. and in other industrialised 
nations. New Zealand, for example, appears to have relatively high 
20. 
interest rates, a high cost structure and unemployment problems which 
have led to the current wage and price freeze which lS intended to 
prevent a domestically created recession that might result in future 
growth below capacity. Third world developing countries have been 
severely burdened by high interest rates and an increasing debt load. 
More than 40 countries are falling behind on their international 
debt payments with Mexico and Argentina two of the more prominent 
examples. The temptations by developed countries to support their 
domestic industries - both agricultural and manufactured goods -
usually works to the detriment of developing nations and the movement 
toward trade protectionism and/or export subsidies exacerbates the 
problem. 
In summary while many signs point toward world economic recovery 
it is not clear that the expected recovery will be all that strong 
nor that New Zealand will be in a position to benefit. Hopefully 
for the New Zealand agricultural sector CER will be successful, 
world markets will improve with an economic recovery, and sound 
domestic monetary and labour policy will prevail to avoid internal 
receSSlon. u.s. macroeconomic and agricultural policies are an 
important part of the world picture but commodity fundamentals, 
continued high rates of productivity and competitiveness, New Zealand 
domestic policy and the trade discussions and negotiations by 
industrialised and developing nations will be the primary determinants 
of the welfare of New Zealand farmers in the next few months and 
years. 
2 I . 
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